The Bank of England ended up linking the American Revolution circuitously with imperial trade policy. Upon its 1694 creation, the Bank of England provided a modern form of banking that allowed for massive loans and large government debts, which in turn facilitated the creation of a stronger centralized government and an expanded army and navy. The British Empire had acquired a fiscal-military state, a modernized political economic system that could fund a standing army and navy across the empire through a combination of public debt and large revenues. This development had long-term repercussions felt throughout the globe, including among the peripheral British colonies of North America. The other European imperial powers had little choice but to follow Britain's fiscal-military suit. European governments increasingly had access to substantial lines of credit and revenue. Warfare, imperial expansion, and balance-ofpower politics all took on ever more global proportions as the European powers played a taxing game of "catch up" with their imperial rivals. Most spectacularly, the French and British fought the first "great war" from 1689 to 1815. However, these same mounting demands of the fiscal-military state began requiring massive injections of New World wealth into the European economy.
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Subscriber: University of Exeter; date: 03 December 2016 in 1754 in the Ohio Valley sparked a global conflict-the Seven Years' War (1756-1763)-that was felt on nearly every continent. The war spanned from French Canada, the Great Lakes, and the Caribbean, to Bengal, Manila, West Africa, and the coast of France. The war also sparked a fiscal-military crisis within the British Empire, with long-term consequences for U.S. foreign trade policy. The end result led to the American Revolution and over a century of strained Anglo-American trade relations.
Britain's eventual military victory in the Seven Years' War also had long-term repercussions for European power politics. In the New World, Britain gained the French North American territories. The very gains from the war's settlement put more strain on British imperial finances. How would the empire pay for the defense of these large swathes of territory? Part of the answer lay in placing greater fiscal demands upon the British North American colonists to pay for their own defense. Such increases in colonial taxation without imperial representation, along with the growing market power of the thirteen colonies, in turn planted the seeds of dissent among Britain's North American colonists. The growth of the British Empire's fiscal-military need for revenue and liquidity therefore placed the marketplace of the peripheral thirteen colonies-and thus colonial trade policies-more and more into the center of British imperial debates.
Colonial consumer politics contributed to revolutionary demands. Mass consumption in the colonies helped create a unique colonial identity, a testament to colonists' growing economic and political individualism. For example, British colonial consumption of tea had stymied any possible cultural and political divisions. But colonial non-importation of these goods throughout the 1760s and 1770s demonstrated growing willingness among colonists, the majority of whom yet hugged the Atlantic coast, to stand together against the expansive-and expensive-system espoused by the debt-ridden imperial center in London, which viewed the seemingly decadent, free-loading thirteen colonies as able to bear more of the exorbitant costs of the modern fiscal-military empire.
It was this very fiscal-military crisis in the colonies that Adam Smith sought to resolve in calling for a complete change in the trade relationship between the imperial metropole and its disgruntled North American colonies. But the military successes of the Revolutionary army made Smith's proposed colonial trade reforms irrelevant. The end result was the creation of the United States. The subsequent Anglophobia and geopolitical tensions between the fledgling nation and its former motherland would lead to a series of Anglo-American trade wars in the next century and played a key role in shaping the development of U.S. foreign trade policy up to World War I. 
From Trade Wars to the War of 1812
The young country immediately found itself threatened on all sides. U.S. foreign trade policy reflected, and at times exacerbated, this geopolitical quandary. The United States was surrounded on all sides by hostile European empires, whether by land or by sea. The country's access to previously lucrative shipping lines and international markets was cut off. Yet the American national government found itself unable to override the intractability of the states on issues concerning public debt, domestic and foreign taxation, and providing for national defense-all key elements for a functioning modern fiscal-military state-owing to the decentralizing tendencies inherent in the Articles of Confederation. In other words, the U.S. government was effectively helpless when it came to protecting the country's foreign trade.
The Spanish Empire struck in 1784 in the American West, cutting off the Mississippi River to American shipping. John Jay, after much wrangling, was able to obtain potential, but not guaranteed, use of the Mississippi. This was not enough for some in the American South, dependent as that section was upon foreign exports. James Wilkinson of Kentucky, for instance, spent three months in 1787 with the Spanish governor of New Orleans, at the end of which Wilkinson pledged allegiance to Spain and suggested that he could deliver Kentucky to the Spanish Empire.
The episode hints at the problems facing both the future of U.S. foreign trade policy and the nation itself. In 1784, Massachusetts farmers found themselves unable to supply the fiscal demands being placed upon them, and they expressed their outrage with an armed uprising known as Shays' Rebellion. James Madison, the man who would become known as "the Father of the Constitution," came to believe the farmers were undertaking secret communications with the viceroy of Canada. All of this was occurring as Vermont considered union with Canada and as others in the West similarly flirted with the British in order to gain shipping and fishing access in the Great Lakes. As George Washington observed in 1784, "the western settlers … stand as it were upon a pivot; the touch of a feather would turn them any way."
Even as American leadership looked helplessly on as the country found itself surrounded on all sides by hostile European powers, Barbary pirates began raiding American merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. Suddenly bereft of British naval protection, U.S. trade was cut off from the Mediterranean. Desperate American officials John Adams and John Jay unsuccessfully attempted to obtain naval assistance from the Spanish, French, and even the British. Jefferson-so often associated with the agrarian-based ideology of free trade called "Jeffersonianism"-was so upset by European refusals of protection that in 1786 he suggested that Congress should enact a special punitive tariff on European commerce to make up the expense. The Barbary threat to American Mediterranean trade greatly affected commercial calls for constitutional reform. The diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey has gone so far as to suggest that "in an indirect sense, the brutal Dey of Algiers was a Founding Father of the Constitution."
Lacking an adequate fiscal-military state, many of these foreign trade crises stemmed from the American national government's inability to raise federal revenues, which were in large part gathered indirectly through import tariffs well into the 20th century. The federal government was in a bind, as it was unsure of how to pay off its foreign debt, which had grown quickly from 1783 to 1788. Nor did it know how it was going to pay for a sufficient army and navy to defend American territory and commercial interests. Farmers were not the only ones suffering from a decentralized U.S. foreign trade policy in the 1780s. Unlike U.S. agrarian desires for freer foreign trade, American protectionists, especially struggling "infant" industrialists in Pennsylvania and New England and their representatives in Congress, called for greater regulation of U.S. commercial policy. They thought that by erecting federal protective tariff barriers, America's domestic "infant" industries would be able to mature. Under the Articles of Confederation, however, no uniform national tariff policy could be established, nor were the predominantly agrarian, export-oriented southern states in favor of such a policy. One British magazine happily reported in 1785 that "the restraint laid upon [American] 
Westward Expansion and the Civil War, 1816-1865
The largest transformations in U.S. foreign trade policy during the long 19th century most often occurred (1) as a consequence of war, (2) in the wake of economic crises, or (3) in those rare instances in which one party found itself in control over both houses of Congress and the executive branch. The years that followed the War of 1812 were no exception. The Tariff of 1816, for example, was meant to shelter U.S. infant industries from Britain's more advanced industrial exports and was sold to the pro-free-trade Anglophobic South as a temporary preventative measure in case of another war with Britain. Then, in 1819, an economic panic struck. U.S. economic nationalists used the Panic of 1819 to gain the upper hand in federal politics, and thereafter passed a series of protectionist bills in 1824, 1828, 1832, and 1842, all of which were aimed at insulating "infant" Pennsylvania iron industries, hemp growers in Kentucky, and sugar growers in Louisiana, among others, from foreign competition. Owing in no small part to changes in British trade policy and to U.S. westward expansion, those supporting trade liberalization were able to turn the protectionist tide in 1846. York Post argued in January 1846 that a "free trade tariff on both sides will settle the matter quickly and give us something better to do than fighting." The ACLL gave its encouragement from across the Atlantic, even as the Corn Laws were on the verge of being overturned. For both sides of the debate, trade was linked to security: for AngloAmerican Cobdenite idealists, trade liberalization was linked to peace; for American protectionists, trade barriers were at once a defensive and offensive weapon for a world perpetually at war.
The coinciding of transatlantic trade liberalization with famine in Ireland held forth the possible expansion of free-grown wheat exports to Europe, while simultaneously undermining the European reliance upon slave-grown cotton. The Irish potato famine only added to the Cobdenite desire for Anglo-American trade liberalization. Overturning the Corn Laws promised several benefits: easy access to non-slave-grown U.S. western wheat; potentially providing Great Britain with cheap U.S. grain; strengthening the power of the antislavery states in Congress; and ameliorating Anglo-American tensions through strengthened trade ties. Anglo-American Cobdenites were proven partly right. The year 1846 witnessed the passage of the low 1846 Walker Tariff, abolishing the English Corn Laws, a modest increase in U.S. wheat and corn exports to Ireland, and a peaceful end to the Oregon boundary dispute.
Less peacefully, the U.S. Navy's Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan, at cannon's mouth, to open the island nation's ports to U.S. trade in 1853. Japan had been closed to Western trade for more than two centuries. In 1854 Perry, representing the U.S. government, required that Japan sign a treaty allowing U.S. merchant ships access to select Japanese ports. Another treaty was signed in 1858 opening up even more Japanese ports to U.S. trade. Perry's opening up of Japanese markets contributed to the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867 and the rise of the so-called Meiji Restoration in 1868.
Without the threat of cannon, the United States also set up a reciprocity agreement with the British colony of Canada in 1854. The reciprocal trade regime tended toward trade liberalization between the two contiguous states. But to the chagrin of Anglo-American free traders, little else along these lines developed in the years that followed.
The passage of the low tariff of 1857 turned out to be the last U.S. legislation in favor of trade liberalization for more than half a century. An economic panic coincided closely with the new legislation, and the protectionist majority of the recently formed Republican Party would make good political use of this timing. The Republicans won the 1860 presidential election on a platform built around antislavery and economic nationalism. 
America's Outward Thrust, 1865-1889
After the Civil War, a perception grew among more and more Americans that overproduction and surplus capital required foreign markets. A great debate arose, however, over whether the United States should access them peaceably or coercively; that is, whether the United States should practice free trade or protectionism as its preferred foreign trade policy. Geopolitical insecurity and domestic politics became entwined with U.S. foreign trade policy. Anglophobic Republicans sought a combination of protectionism and informal imperialism-the imperialism of economic nationalism-to counteract British free-trade imperialism in the Western Hemisphere, to stave off cheap exports from free-trade England in order to protect U.S. infant industries, and to maintain artificially high prices for goods and wages for workers. Those favoring free trade argued instead that trade liberalization would lessen Anglo-American tensions, peaceably increase U.S. exports, and make goods cheaper for all Americans. The importance of wages and prices in the fight over U.S. trade policy highlights as well the growth of American consumer demands for international products throughout this period. The onset of a series of economic depressions between 1873-1896 only polarized the debate, whereupon the Republican Party's Anglophobic promise of high prices and high wages alongside coercive market expansion tended to win out over the free traders' promise of cheap goods and peaceful foreign market expansion. The "tariff question" thus came to dominate postbellum U.S. political debates.
The 1865 victory of the Union brought an end to the southern system of slavery. In the years of Reconstruction that followed, with a wary eye toward free-trade England, the Republican Party (based largely in northern manufacturing regions) fast turned its attention from supporting African American civil rights to supporting protectionist trade policies. In 1883, Republicans oversaw the passage of the protectionist 1883 "Mongrel Tariff," so named because neither party wanted to take credit for the measure. By 1884, Republicans would ideologically and politically coalesce around the American System of economic nationalism, with long-term effects for U.S. foreign trade policy.
Republican economic nationalism sparked retaliation in Canada, and thus played a critical role in determining the course of North American economic integration.
Republican protectionists, still stinging from perceived British diplomatic slights during the Civil War, were quick to abrogate the reciprocity treaty with Canada in 1865, as both states turned to economic and political nationalism. Canada had passed its first protective tariff in 1859 (the Galt Tariff), and it gained even greater sovereignty over its foreign trade policy when it confederated in 1867. In 1879, largely in response to continued Republican unwillingness to liberalize trade between the contiguous states, Canadian Conservatives consolidated around an economic nationalist platform that was openly hostile toward its southern neighbor. It also included a desire for stronger economic ties with the rest of the British world of white settler colonies. The Conservatives sought protectionism to guard Canada's infant industries from its more developed southern neighbor and to retaliate against Anglophobic Republican desires to build a high tariff wall along the Canadian-American border.
Some Republican imperialists were also beginning to cast an expansive eye toward the Pacific in the 1870s. In 1875, the Republican administration of Ulysses S. Grant signed a reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, foreshadowing a revolutionary shift that would occur under the 1890 McKinley Tariff. Republican-style reciprocity would become an established program for informal imperial expansion into foreign markets. Providing a hint of the Republican informal imperial program that would be enshrined in the 1890 McKinley Tariff, the 1875 treaty forbade Hawaii, or the Sandwich Islands, from signing reciprocity treaties with other countries that promised the same concessions as those given to the United States. The influence of American Cobdenite free traders within Cleveland's cabinet held out the possibility of a shift toward trade liberalization and foreign policy noninterventionism as an alternative to Republican protectionism and imperialism. Upon taking office, the Cleveland administration extricated the country from proposed Republican imperial plans to annex territory in Nicaragua for the construction of an isthmian canal and from coercively expanding U.S. economic influence in the Congo and Samoa. The Cobdenite Cleveland administration also sought to take an ameliorative approach toward U.S.-Canadian economic relations. Democratic tariff bills for freer trade, in turn, were proposed unsuccessfully in 1886 and 1888. In December 1887, Cleveland provocatively called for freer trade in his annual message, forcing the coming year's elections-the 1888 "Great Debate" over low or high tariffs-into a referendum on U.S. foreign trade policy.
Once again, Anglo-American relations contributed to debates over U.S. trade policy. Conspiratorial charges that Cleveland and his cabinet were in league with free-trade England followed the administration's policies of noninterventionism and freer trade. Republican Reciprocity and U.S. Imperialism,
1890-1898
Following the release of the 1890 Census, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner pessimistically pondered what the end of the American continental frontier might mean for U.S. democracy and expansion. In an era frequented by economic panics and by fears of British free trade imperialism in Latin America, the Pacific, and the United States itself, more and more Americans were desirous of accessing foreign markets. With the end of Turner's "frontier," political and ideological debates over U.S. foreign trade policy were also becoming increasingly tied to debates over American imperialism.
Republican control of both congressional houses allowed passage of the McKinley Tariff in October 1890. The bill's extreme levels of protectionism-including an ad valorem rate of approximately 50 percent-sent economic shockwaves to the far reaches of the earth, highlighting the global impact of U.S. trade policy by the late 19th century. For example, nationalist calls for protectionism in India increased, thousands were put out of work in Germany, Britain, and Austria, and it was reported that one wool mill owner in Lichtenberg was even driven to suicide as a result of the U.S. legislation, and demands for imperial federation and tariff retaliation arose throughout the British World of white settler colonies.
The imperial-minded administration of Benjamin Harrison also innovatively began implementing what would become a key protectionist weapon in the Republican Party's informal imperial arsenal-reciprocity. The reciprocity provision in the new protectionist legislation included a conditional most-favored-nation clause, in contrast to the inclusivity of an unconditional most-favored-nation clause that free traders supported. Not only could the reciprocity treaty lower tariff rates with signatories; the U.S. president could decide to retaliate with massive punitive tariffs against signatories if they were deemed to have deviated from the terms of the agreement. The goal was to induce Latin American states to sign exclusive reciprocal agreements with the United States, and thereby undercut the economic influence of the European powers in the hemisphere. Signatories included El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Spanish-controlled Puerto Rico and Cuba. The ad hoc nature of what is better described as a closed-door empire followed U.S. trade policy toward Puerto Rico in 1900. Republican protectionists fast realized that if they opened U.S. doors to Puerto Rican trade, they would next have to open them to Cuban sugar and tobacco growers and to cheap Filipino labor. A McKinley administration spokesman rather aptly described the dilemma in April 1900: the President did not "want any legislation for Puerto Rico that will keep us from legislating for Manila." It was then decided that the United States would extend a slight discount on Puerto Rican imports, but still would levy protective duties. The Supreme Court gave its legal seal of approval in the first of many so-called Insular Cases. The May 1901 decision effectively gave legal sanction to the U.S. imperialism of economic nationalism. The court decreed that the U.S. government had the right to enact protectionist legislation on Puerto Rican imports. The court's decision led the British writer Sidney Brooks to declare, "The American Empire is a Protectionist Empire." Other critics noted that it meant that the U.S. colonies would remain outside the powers guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. President McKinley's ad hoc imperialism of economic nationalism was then promptly enacted in the recently acquired colonies. For example, from 1898 to 1902, the U.S. government treated the Philippines as a foreign state, fearing an influx of Asian exports and immigrants if the colony were given free access to the U.S. market. The 1902 U.S. Revenue Act thereafter gave Filipino exports a 25 percent discount when entering the United States. The subsequent "splits" tax-a 100 percent tax on non-U.S. textiles-was supposed to spark Filipino purchases of U.S. cotton textiles, but the increased prices were too high for the poverty-stricken people. The results of the "splits" tax earned the ire of the Episcopalian bishop of the Philippines, Charles H. Bent, in 1906. and Fred Merk (1934) , a subject that has since been revisited by , and Crapol (1973 ), Tom Terrill (1973 ), and Thomas McCormick (1967 have delved more deeply into the domestic and congressional politics over foreign trade, as has the earlier work of Edward Stanwood (1903) and Frank Taussig (1924 , 1931 . Innovative studies of U.S.
economic globalization, such as those of Kristin Hoganson (2007) and Emily Rosenberg (1982 Rosenberg ( , 2003 , in turn have begun to draw much-needed attention to the important role that American consumer culture, financial missionaries, and multinational corporations have The influence of Gallagher and Robinson's "imperialism of free trade" thesis also played a critical role in the shaping of the Wisconsin School's revisionist scholarship, as it allowed them to uncover an informal U.S. empire-an Open Door Empire-built around U.S. foreign trade policy. Williams (1959 Williams ( , 1969 described Open Door imperialism as the American version of the imperialism of free trade. For the Wisconsin School, debates over the course of U.S. foreign trade policy were portrayed as tactical debates of informal U.S. imperial expansion-assertions that the nature of U.S. capitalism tragically and inevitably led to U.S. imperialism since its founding. Americans at all levels-government, business, agrarian, labor, Republicans, and Democrats-were thus portrayed as advocates of American free trade or open-door imperial expansion that is commonly associated with U.S. "neoliberal" trade expansion after World War II, culminating in the rise of the "Washington Consensus" within U.S. foreign trade policy in the late 1980s.
The Wisconsin School's revisionist open-door imperial scholarship has not gone unchallenged. William Becker (1982) has uncovered how the intensity of industrial demands for U.S. export promotion into foreign markets at the turn of the century was far from even or universal. And in the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars like David Pletcher (1998, 2001) and Alfred Eckes (1995) placed renewed attention upon the 19th-century debates over foreign trade policy and the opening of America's market. They also emphasized the ad hoc shifts in U.S. foreign market expansion, rather than the Wisconsin School's portrayal of bipartisan imperial continuity. More recently, the Wisconsin School's free trade characterization of U.S. foreign trade policy has come under scrutiny for the long 19th century. Historians now note that U.S. foreign trade policy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular-where so much revisionist open-door scholarship has focused-was a period when economic nationalist trade policies dominated. Historians such as Marc-William Palen suggest instead that this was not an open-door empire, but an expansive closed-door empire; through a combination of protectionism and restrictive reciprocity, the United States practiced the imperialism of economic nationalism, not the imperialism of free trade. In other words, the United States was enforcing preferential protectionist measures on its formal and informal empire, not free trade. This post-revisionist scholarship accordingly draws renewed attention to the great debate over U.S. foreign trade policy, to the economic ideas that underpinned it, and to its consequences for U.S. imperial expansion to 1914. 
Primary Sources
The papers of many of the key shapers of U.S. foreign trade policy throughout the long 19th century are now available in print, on microfilm, and in American archives. See, especially, the archival holdings of the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Historical Society, and the New York Public Library. The debate over U.S. foreign trade policy filled the free trade and protectionist organizational propaganda, be it pamphlets, speeches, conference proceedings, cartoons, and leaflets. 
